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Abstract. The MISTY1 algorithm, proposed by Matsui in FSE 1997, is a block cipher with a
64-bit block size and a 128-bit key size. It was recommended by the European NESSIE project and
the CRYPTREC project, and became one RFC in 2002 and an ISO standard in 2005, respectively.
In this paper, we first investigate the properties of the FL linear function and identify 232 subkey-
dependent zero-correlation linear approximations over 5-round MISTY1 with 3 FL layers. Fur-
thermore, some observations on the FL, FO and FI functions are founded and based upon those
observations, we select 27 subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations and then, pro-
pose the zero-correlation linear attacks on 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers. Besides, for the case
without FL layers, 27 zero-correlation linear approximations over 5-round MISTY1 are employed to
the analysis of 7-round MISTY1.
The zero-correlation linear attack on the 7-round with 4 FL layers needs about 2119.5 encryptions
with 262.9 known plaintexts and 261 memory bytes. For the attack on 7-round without FL layers,
the data complexity is about 263.9 known plaintexts, the time complexity is about 281 encryptions
and the memory requirements are about 293 bytes. Both have lower time complexity than previous
attacks.
Keywords: MISTY1, Block cipher, Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, Cryptography
1 Introduction
MISTY1 is a block cipher designed by Matsui[16] in FSE 1997. Since selected as one of
Japanese e-Government standard ciphers by the CRYPTREC project in 2002, MISTY1 be-
came widely deployed in Japan. Outside of Japan, MISTY1 was one of the final portfolio
of the NESSIE-recommended ciphers[18], and approved as one RFC [17] in 2000 and as an
ISO standard[9] in 2005, respectively. Besides, MISTY1 was selected as the blueprint of the
GSM/3G block cipher KASUMI[20], which is one of the most widely used block ciphers in the
world. For those reasons, it is very important to understand the security offered by MISTY1.
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2Table 1: Summary of the attacks on MISTY1
Attack Type Rounds FL Layer Date Complexity Time Complexity Source
HOD 7 3 254.1CP 2120.7Enc [21]
IA 6 4 232CP 2126.09Enc [19]
ID 6 None 254CP 261Enc [12]
ID 7 None 250.2CP 2114.1Enc [13]
ID 7 None 255CP 292.2Enc [10]
ID 6 4 252.5CP 2112.4Enc [10]
ID 7 3 258KP 2124.4Enc [10]
MZCL 7 None 263.9KP 281Enc Sect.[5]
MZCL 7 4 262.9KP 2118Enc Sect.[4]
HOD: Higher-Order Differential; IA: Integral Attack; ID: Impossible Differential; MZCL: Multidimensional
Zero-Correlation Linear; CP: Chosen Plaintext; KP: Known Plaintext; Enc: Encryption.
In the past 15 years, many cryptanalytic methods have been used to evaluate the security
of MISTY1. For the low order degree of the S-boxes used in MISTY1, Babbage[1] gave the
first higher order differential cryptanalysis of 5-round MISTY1 without FL layers. Tsunoo
et al.[21] introduced the higher order differential cryptanalysis of 7-round MISTY1 with FL
layers, which is a chosen plaintext attack. Ku¨hn [11] gave the first 6-round impossible differ-
ential cryptanalysis, which was improved by Lu et al.[13] with lower data complexity and time
complexity. Ku¨hn [12] introduced a slicing attack on 4 rounds MISTY1. Later, combining the
slicing attack and the generic impossible differential attack against 5-round Feistel construc-
tions, Dunkelman et al.[7] gave a 6-round cryptanalytic result for MISTY1 with FL layers
and a 7-round cryptanalytic result without FL layers. Recently, taking advantage of some
observations on FL functions and the early-abort technique, Jia et al.[10] improved a pre-
vious impossible differential attack on 6-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers, 7-round MISTY1
with 3 FL layers and 7-round MISTY1 without FL layers. For the results in respect to the
methods such as integral attacks, collision search attacks and attacks under certain weak key
assumptions, the related-key differential and amplified boomerang cryptanalysis of MISTY1,
see [19],[11],[6],[14],[15].
In this paper, we apply the recent zero-correlation linear attacks to the block cipher
MISTY1. Zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, proposed by Bogdanov and Rijmen[4], is a
novel promising attack technique for block ciphers. It uses zero-correlation linear approxi-
mations generally existing in block ciphers to distinguish the differences between a random
3permutation and a block cipher, which is different from the traditional linear cryptanalysis
where high-correlation linear characteristics are used. The initial distinguishers [4] have some
limitations in terms of data complexity, which needs at least half of the codebook. Bogdanov
and Wang [5] proposed a more data-efficient distinguisher by making use of multiple zero-
correlation linear approximations. The date complexity is reduced, however, the distinguish-
ers rely on the assumption that all zero-correlation linear approximations are independent.
To remove the unnecessary independency assumptions on the distinguishing side, multidi-
mensional distinguishers [3] were constructed for the zero-correlation property at AsiaCrypt
2012. Recently, the multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis were used in the
analysis of the block cipher CAST-256[3], CLEFIA[2], HIGHT[22], E2[23] and KASUMI[24].
In this paper, we evaluate the security of MISTY1 with respect to the multidimensional
zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Our contributions are summarized as follows:
1. We investigate the propagation characteristics of the linear masks on FL function and
then propose four types of 5-round subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximation
of MISTY1. Each type contains 232 linear approximations, and the input masks and output
masks of which are subkey-dependent. However, if all 232 linear approximations are taken
in consideration in the key recovery process of MISTY1, there will be too many subkey bits
involved that the time complexity will be greater than exhaustive search. Fortunately, we
find some observations on FO, FI and FL functions that when some special output masks
are selected, only a part of keys influence the correlations of the linear approximations. For
instance, if we set the right 9-bit output masks of FI function to zero, the absolute value of
the correlations of the linear approximations will be independent with the involved subkeys.
Those observations help us to select suitable linear approximations, which can reduce the
number of the guessed subkey bits.
2. Based on the selected subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations, we
propose the multidimensional zero-correlation linear attack on 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL
layers using the partial-sum technique and the relations among subkeys obtained by the key
schedule. Besides, MISTY1 without FL layers adopts strict balance Feistel structure, which
has 232 nature zero-correlation linear approximations[4]. We select 27 ones based on the
observations on FO, FI and FL functions, and propose the multidimensional zero-correlation
linear attack on 7-round MISTY1 without FL layers
The paper is organized as follows. We list some notations, briefly describe the block
cipher MISTY1, outline the ideas of multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis
and explain why the subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations are available
in Section 2. Four types of 5-round subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations
of MISTY1 are shown in Section 3, as well as some observations on FL, FO and FI functions.
Section 4 and Section 5 illustrate our attacks on 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers and
without FL layers. We conclude this paper in Section 6.
42 Preliminaries
2.1 Notations
FLi : the i-th FL function of MSITY1 with subkey KLi.
FOi : the i-th FO function of MSITY1 with subkey (KOi,KIi).
FIij : the j-th FI function of FOi with subkey KIij .
∧ : bitwise AND.
∨ : bitwise OR.
⊕ : bitwise XOR.
¬ : bitwise NOT.
a · b : the scalar product of binary vectors by a · b = ⊕n−1i=0 aibi.
X‖Y : the concatenation of X and Y .
z[i] : the i-th bit of z, and ′0′ is the most significant bit.
z[i1 − i2] : the (i2 − i1 + 1) bits from the i1-th bit to i2-th bit of z.
f ◦ g : the composite function of f and g.
f−1 : the inverse function of f .
2.2 Description of KASUMI
The MISTY1 algorithms [16] is a symmetric block cipher with a block size of 64 bits and a
key size of 128 bits. It adopts a 8-round Feistel structure with an FL layer every 2 rounds,
see Fig. 1 (a) for an illustration. The FL layer consists of two FL functions. The FL function
is a simple key-dependent boolean function, depicted in Fig. 1 (d). Let the inputs of the
FL function of the i-th round be XLi = XLi,l‖XLi,r,KLi = (KLi,1,KLi,2), the output be
Y Li = Y Li,l‖Y Li,r, where XLi,l, XLi,r, Y Li,l and Y Li,r are 16-bit integers. We define the
FL function as follows:
Y Li,r = (XLi,l ∧KLi,1)⊕XLi,r;
Y Li,l = (Y Li,r ∨KLi,2)⊕XLi,l.
The round function, that is the FO function, depicted in Fig. 1 (b), is another 3-round Feis-
tel structure consisting of 3 FI functions and the key mixing stages. Let XOi = XOi,l‖XOi,r,
KOi = (KOi,1,KOi,2,KOi,3,KOi,4), KIi = (KIi,1,KIi,2,KIi,3) be the inputs of the FO
function of i-th round, and Y Oi = Y Oi,l‖Y Oi,r be the corresponding output, where XOi,l,
5Figure 1: The structure and building blocks of MISTY1
XOi,r, Y Oi,l, Y Oi,r and XIi,3 are 16-bit integers. Then the FO function has the form
XIi,3 = FI((XOi,l ⊕KOi,1),KIi,1)⊕XOi,r;
Y Oi,l = FI((XOi,r ⊕KOi,2),KIi,2)⊕XIi,3 ⊕KOi,4;
Y Oi,r = FI((XIi,3 ⊕KOi,3),KIi,3)⊕ Y Oi,l ⊕KOi,4.
The structure of the FI function is depicted in Fig. 1 (c). It uses two S-boxes S7 and S9
which are permutations of 7-bit to 7-bit and 9-bit to 9-bit respectively. Let XIi,j , Y Ii,j be
the inputs and the outputs of the j-th FI function of the i-th round, where XIi,j and Y Ii,j
are 16-bit integers. Denote that KIi,j,l = KIi,j [0 − 8], KIi,j,r = KIi,j [9 − 15], and Y Ii,j,l,
Y Ii,j,l are two 7-bit variables, Y Ii,j,r, Y Ii,j,r are two 9-bit variables. The FI function can be
6Table 2: The key schedule of MISTY1
KOi,1 KOi,2 KOi,3 KOi,4 KIi,1 KIi,2 KIi,3 KLi,1 KLi,2
Ki Ki+2 Ki+7 Ki+4 K
′
i+5 K
′
i+1 K
′
i+3 K i+1
2
(odd i) K′i+1
2
+6
(odd i)
K′i
2
+2
(even i) K i
2
+4(even i)
described as follows:
Y Ii,j,r = S9(XIi,j [0− 8])⊕XIi,j [9− 15];
Y Ii,j,l = S7(XIi,j [9− 15])⊕ Y Ii,j,r;
Y Ii,j,l = Y Ii,j,l ⊕KIi,j,l;
Y Ii,j,r = S9(Y Ii,j,r ⊕KIi,j,r)⊕ Y Ii,j,l;
Y Ii,j = Y Ii,j,l‖Y Ii,j,r,
where a 9-bit variable α bitwise XOR a 7-bit variable β, the 7-bit variable β is first extend
to 9-bit with two ‘0‘bits in the left, while a 7-bit variable β bitwise XOR a 9-bit variable α,
the 9-bit variable α is truncated to 7-bit ignoring the left two bits.
Let (L0, R0), (L8, R8) are the plaintext and ciphertext, and Li||Ri =
(
(Li,l‖Li,r)‖(Ri,l‖Ri,r)
)
be the output of the (i− 1)-th round, i = 1, 2..., 7 and then the round function is defined as:
(Li, Ri) =

(
FO
(
FL(Li−1)
)⊕ FL(Ri−1), FL(Li−1)), when i = 1, 3, 5, 7;(
FO(Li−1)⊕Ri−1, Li−1
)
, when i = 2, 4, 6;(
FL(FO(Li−1)⊕Ri−1), FL(Li−1)
)
, when i = 8.
The key schedule of MISTY1 takes the 128-bit key, which is divided into eight 16-bit
words: (K1,K2, ...,K8), that is K = (K1,K2, ...,K8). From this set of subkeys, another
eight 16-bit words are generated according to K ′i = FIKi+1(Ki). KLi = (KLi,1,KLi,2),
KOi = (KOi,1,KOi,2,KOi,3,KOi,4), and KIi = (KIi,1,KIi,2,KIi,3) are listed in Tab.2.
2.3 Zero-correlation Linear cryptanalysis
Consider a function f : Fn2 7→ Fm2 and let the input of the function be x ∈ Fn2 . A linear
approximation with an input mask α and an output mask β is the following function:
x 7→ β · f(x)⊕ a · x,
7and its correlation is defined as follows
C(β · f(x), a · x) = 2Prx(β · f(x)⊕ a · x = 0)− 1.
In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, the distinguishers use linear approximations with
zero correlation for all keys while the classical linear cryptanalysis utilizes linear approxi-
mations with correlation far from zero. The basic idea of zero-correlation linear attack can
be seen as the projection of impossible differential cryptanalysis to linear cryptanalysis. To
construct the zero-correlation linear approximations, one adopts the miss-in-the-middle tech-
niques just like to find impossible differential. Any linear approximations with nonzero bias is
concatenated to any linear approximations with nonzero bias in the inverse direction, where
the intermediate masks states contradict with each other.
Bogdanov et al. [5] proposed a multidimensional zero-correlation linear distinguisher using
` zero-correlation linear approximations and requiring O(2n+2/√`) distinct known plaintexts,
where n is the block size of a cipher. Let the zero-correlation linear distinguishers be the
first r − 1 rounds of a r-round block cipher. The zero-correlation linear approximations are
available as a linear space spanned by m base zero-correlation linear approximations such
that all ` = 2m non-zero linear combinations of them have zero correlation. For each of the
2m data values z ∈ Fm2 , the attacker initializes a counter V [z], z = 0, 1, ..., 2m − 1 with all
elements being zero. Then, the attacker computes the data value z in Fm2 by evaluating the
m basis linear approximations, that is, z[i] = αi · p⊕ βi · c′ , i = 0, ...,m− 1, where (p, c′) is
obtained from any distinct plaintext-ciphertext pair (p, c) after partial decryption of the last
round and (αi, βi) denotes the i-th basis linear approximation. Thus, the value of z can be
gotten, then the attacker increases the corresponding data value of the counter V [z] by one.
After all needed distinct plaintext-ciphertext pairs are computed, the attacker computes the
statistic T :
T =
2m−1∑
z=0
(V [z]−N2−m)2
N2−m(1− 2−m) . (2.1)
The statistic T follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ0 = (` − 1)2n−N2n−1 and variance σ20 =
2(` − 1)(2n−N2n−1 )2 for the right key guess, while for the wrong key guess, it follows a X 2-
distribution with mean µ1 = `− 1 and variance σ21 = 2(`− 1).
If the probability of the type-I error and the type-II error to distinguish between a wrong
key and a right key are denoted as β0 and β1, respectively, considering the decision threshold
τ = µ0 + σ0z1−β0 = µ1 − σ0z1−β1 , the number of known plaintexts N should be about
N =
(2n − 1)(z1−β0 + z1−β1)√
(`− 1)/2 + z1−β0
+ 1, (2.2)
where z1−β0 and z1−β1are the respective quantiles of the standard normal distribution. More
details are described in [3].
8Figure 2: Property of XOR, Branching, AND, OR, FL and FI functions
However, we employ ` = 2m non-zero linear combinations of the m base subkey-dependent
zero-correlation linear approximations, that is, the output masks of the linear approximations
can be deduced by the input masks and the subkeys. When the guessed subkeys are right, T
follows a X 2 -distribution with mean µ0 = (`− 1)2n−N2n−1 and variance σ20 = 2(`− 1)
(
2n−N
2n−1
)2
,
while the guessed subkeys are wrong, V [z] also follows the multinomial distribution, although
the linear approximations used can not be guaranteed to be zero-correlation linear approxima-
tions, that is, for the wrong key guess, T also follows aX 2-distribution with mean µ1 = `−1
and variance σ21 = 2(`− 1).
Thus, the multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis using the subkey-dependent
linear approximations can be processed in the following steps.
(1) Find some longest subkeys-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations by using
properties of encryption algorithm. Assume that the dimensional number of the distin-
guishers is `.
(2) Allocate a subkey-dependent counter Vk[z] for `-bit z. The vector z is the concatenation
of evaluations of ` subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear approximations.
(3) Update the counter Vk[z] by guessing the subkeys in the process of partial-encryption
and partial-decryption one after another by using the partial-sum technique.
(4) Guess the linear approximations involved subkeys k , compute statistic T according
Equation (2.1). If T ≤ τ , then the guessed subkey values are possible right subkey
candidates, where τ is computed in traditional method.
(5) Do exhaustive search for all right candidates.
Furthermore, the relations among subkeys can be obtained by carefully analyzing the key
schedule algorithm, which can be used to reduce the subkey bits guessed.
93 Some Observations in MSITY1
In this section, we propose some zero-correlation linear approximations of MISTY1. More-
over, some properties of FL, FI and FO functions are discovered.
Lemma 1. [4], [24] Let M be a `-bit value and define the XOR, Branching, OR, AND functions
h1, h2, h3 and h4 as h1(x1, x2) = x1 ⊕ x2, h2(x) = (x, x), h3(x) = M ∨ x, h4(x) = M ∧ x,
see Fig.2 (a,b,c,d). Then we have
(1) For any masks α1, α2 and β, C
(
β · h1(x1, x2), (α1, α2) · (x1, x2)
) 6= 0 if and only if
β = α1 = α2;
(2) For any masks α, β1 and β2, C
(
(β1, β2) · h2(x), α · x
) 6= 0 if and only if α = β1 ⊕ β2;
(3) For any `-bit masks α and β, C(β · h3(x), α · x) 6= 0 if and only if α =qM ∧ β;
(4) For any `-bit masks α and β, C(β · h4(x), α · x) 6= 0 if and only if α = M ∧ β.
Lemma 2. Let (α, α′), (β, β′) be the input and the corresponding output masks of the linear
function FLi with nonzero-correlation, then for any 0 ≤ j ≤ 15, we have
α′[j] = ¬KLi,2[j]β[j]⊕ β′[j], and α[j] = KLi,1[j]α′[j]⊕ β[j],
which can be denote by (α[j], α′[j]) = FLi
j
(β[j], β′[j];KLi,1[j],KLi,2[j]), see Fig.2(e) for
detail. Then the function FLi = (FLi
0
, ..., FLi
15
) has the following two properties:
(1) The function FLi can be denoted as
(α, α′) = FLi(β, β′;KLi,1,KLi,2),
and (α′[j], α[j]) are not influenced by (β′[k], β[k]) and (KLi,1[k],KLi,2[k]), when j 6= k.
(2) The function FLi is linear, that is
FLi(β1 ⊕ β2) = FLi(β1)⊕ FLi(β2),
which means that the FLi function is a linear components for the masks.
Lemma 3. Let α, β be the 16-bit input and the corresponding output masks of the function
FIi,j, where 0 ≤ i ≤ 7 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2, then β = 0 leads to α = 0, if the correlation of the
linear approximation is nonzero.
Proof. Form Lemma 3 in [4], we only need to know the function FI is invertible, which can
be proved easily and we omit it for simplicity.
With those three lemmas, we have some zero-correlation linear approximations on 5-round
MISTY1. We give the descriptions in the following theorem.
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Figure 3: Zero-correlation linear approximations on 5-round MISTY1
Theorem 3.1. Let (0, β) be the output masks of round 7 and (α, 0) be the input masks of
round 3, then (α, 0)
5-Round−→ (0, β) is a zero-correlation linear approximations form round 3 to
7, when α = FL3 ◦ FL5 ◦ FL7(β) and β is a 32-bit nonzero value, see Fig. 3(a). For the
MISTY1 without FL functions, (β, 0)
5-Round−→ (0, β) is a zero-correlation linear approximations
form round r to r + 4, where β is a 32-bit nonzero value and r = 1, 2, 3, see Fig. 3(b).
Some properties of FI and FO functions can be described as the following two observations.
Observation 1. Let β be a 16-bit value with β[7 − 15] = 0 and Y FIi,j the 16-bit output of
the FIi,j function. Then, the value of β ·Y FIi,j can be written as X⊕ (β[0−6] ·KIi,j [0−6]),
where X is an value independent with KIi,j.
Observation 2. Let (β, β′) be a 32-bit value, such that β[7−15] = β′[7−15] = 0, and Y FOi
the 32-bit output of the FOi function. Then the value of (β, β
′) · Y FOi can be written as
Y ⊕ (β[0− 6] · (KIi,3 ⊕KIi,2 ⊕KOi,4)[0− 6])⊕ (β[0− 6] ·KIi,2[0− 6]), where Y is an value
dependent with KOi,1, KOi,2, KOi,3 and KIi,1
4 Key-Recovery Attack on 7-Round MISTY1 with 4 FL Layers
In this section, we extend our attacks to 7-round(2-8) MISTY1 with 4 FL Layers. We mount
the 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations from round 3 to 7, and extend one round
forward and one round as well as one FL layer backward, respectively, see Fig.4(c). We select
the 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations as (α1‖α2, 0) 2 to 6 round−→ (0, β‖0), that is
(α1, α2) · (L1,l, L1,r)⊕ (β, 0) · (R8,l, R8,r) = 0,
11
Figure 4: Attacks on 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers
where β is 16-bit non-zero value with β[7−15] = 0, and α1, α2 are two 16-bit non-zero values
with α1‖α2 = FL3 ◦ FL5 ◦ FL7(β‖0). Then, by Lemma 2, we can know that α1[7 − 15] =
α2[7− 15] = 0.
Basis Subkey-dependent Zero-correlation Masks. From the used subkey-dependent
zero-correlation linear approximates, we know that α1, α2 are two 16-bit non-zero values
with α1‖α2 = FL3 ◦FL5 ◦FL7(β‖0), then 42-bit keys K2[0− 6],K3[0− 6],K4[0− 6],K ′8[0−
6],K ′1[0−6],K ′2[0−6] are involved. Assume that m0,...,m6 are seven 32-bit values, and m0 =
(1, 0, .., 0), m1 = (0, 1, 0, ..., 0),...,m6 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0). For 2
42 possible involved
subkeys, compute
(α1)i‖(α2)i = FL3 ◦ FL5 ◦ FL7(mi),
Store the value zi = (mi[0 − 6]‖(α1)i[0 − 6]‖(α2)i[0 − 6]), i = 0, 1, ..., 6 in a hash table T1
indexed by the 42-bit involved subkeys.
Attack Process. The key-recovery attacks on 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers are
proceeded with the partial-sum technique as follows.
1. Collect N plaintexts with corresponding ciphertexs. Allocate a 8-bit counter V0[y0] for
each of 292 possible values of
y0 = y
1
0‖y20‖y30‖y40‖y50‖y60‖y70‖y80,
12
where y10 = L1,l, y
2
0 = L1,r, y
3
0 = R1,l[0 − 6], y40 = R1,r[0 − 6], y50 = R8,l, y60 = R8,r,
y70 = L8,l[0 − 6], y80 = L8,r[0 − 6], and set them zero. Calculate the number of pairs of
plaintext-ciphertext with given values y0 and save it in V0[y0]. In this step, around 2
64
plaintext-ciphertext pairs are divided into 292 different states. So the assumption V0 as a
8-bit counter is sufficient.
2. Allocate a counter V1[y1] for each of 2
60 possible values of
y1 = y
1
1‖y21‖y31‖y41‖y51‖y61,
where y11 = y
2
0, y
2
1 = y
8
0, and set them zero. For all 2
69 possible values of y10, y
3
0, y
4
0, y
5
0, y
6
0
and y80, guess the 48-bit KO2,1, KL10,1, KL10,2, that is K2, K
′
7 and K1, compute
y31 = y
3
0 ⊕
(
FI2,1(y
2
0 ⊕K2,K ′7)⊕ y11
)
[0− 6];
y41 = y
4
0 ⊕ S9
((
FI2,1(y
2
0 ⊕K2,K ′7)⊕ y11 ⊕K1
)
[0− 8])
⊕(FI2,1(y20 ⊕K2,K ′7)⊕ y11 ⊕K1)[9− 15]
⊕S7
((
FI2,1(y
2
0 ⊕K2,K ′7)⊕ y11 ⊕K1
)
[9− 15]);
y51 = (y
6
0 ∨K1)⊕ y50;
y61 = y
7
0 ⊕ (y51 ∧K ′7)⊕ y60 ⊕ S9
((
(y51 ∧K ′7)⊕ y60 ⊕K2
)
[0− 8])
⊕((y51 ∧K ′7)⊕ y60 ⊕K2)[9− 15]
⊕S7
((
(y51 ∧K ′7)⊕ y60 ⊕K2
)
[9− 15]),
and update the value V1[y1] = V1[y1] + V0[y0].
3. Allocate a counter V2[y2] for each of 2
53 possible values of
y2 = y
1
2‖y22‖y32‖y42‖y52,
where y12 = y
1
1, y
2
2 = y
3
1, y
3
2 = y
4
1, y
4
2 = y
5
1, and set them zero. For all 2
7 possible values of y21,
guess the 7-bit KL9,2[0− 6], that K ′3[0− 6], and compute
y52 = y
6
1 ⊕ (K ′3[0− 6] ∧ y21[0− 6]),
and update the value V2[y2] = V2[y2] + V1[y1].
4. Allocate a counter V3[y3] for each of 2
44 possible values of
y3 = y
1
3‖y23‖y33‖y43‖y53,
13
where y13 = y
1
2, y
2
3 = y
2
2, y
3
3 = y
3
2, y
4
3 = y
4
2[9− 15] and set them zero. For all 29 possible values
of y42[0− 8], guess the 9-bit KO8,1[0− 8], that is K8[0− 8], compute
y53 = y
5
2 ⊕ S9(y42[0− 8]⊕K8[0− 8])[2− 8],
and update the value V3[y3] = V3[y3] + V2[y2].
5. Allocate a counter V4[y4] for each of 2
37 possible values of
y4 = y
1
4‖y24‖y34‖y44,
where y14 = y
1
3, y
2
4 = y
2
3, y
3
4 = y
3
3, and set them zero. For all 2
7 possible values of y43, guess
the 7-bit KO8,1[9− 15], that is K8[9− 15], compute
y44 = y
5
3 ⊕ y43[0− 6]⊕ S7(y43[0− 6]⊕K4[9− 15]),
and update the value V4[y4] = V4[y4] + V3[y3].
6. Allocate a counter V5[y5] for each of 2
28 possible values of
y3 = y
1
5‖y25‖y35‖y45,
where y15 = y
1
4[9−15], y45 = y44 and set them zero. For all 29 possible values of y14[0−8], guess
the 9-bit KO2,2[0− 8], that is K4[0− 8], compute
y25 = y
2
4 ⊕ S9(y14[0− 8]⊕K8[0− 8])[2− 8];
y35 = y
3
4 ⊕ S9(y14[0− 8]⊕K8[0− 8])[2− 8],
and update the value V5[y5] = V5[y5] + V4[y4].
7. Allocate a counter V6[y6] for each of 2
21 possible values of
y6 = y
1
6‖y26‖y36,
where y36 = y
4
5, and set them zero. For all 2
7 possible values of y15, guess the 7-bitKO2,2[9−15],
that is K4[9− 15], compute
y16 = y
2
5 ⊕ y15 ⊕ S7(y15 ⊕K4[9− 15]);
y26 = y
3
5 ⊕ y15 ⊕ S7(y15 ⊕K4[9− 15]),
and update the value V6[y6] = V6[y6] + V5[y5].
8. Up to now, we have guessed 87-bit subkeys K1, K2, K
′
3[0− 6], K4, K ′7 and K8 and we
can deduce K ′8 from K8 and K1 by the key schedule. Guess the 9-bit K ′3[7− 15], and we can
deduce K3 from K
′
3 and K4, deduce K
′
2 from K3 and K2. Form table T1, we can get the 7
basic subkey-dependent zero-correlation masks zi, i = 0, 1, ..., 6.
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9. Allocate a 64-bit counter vector V [z] for 7-bit z, where z is the concatenation of
evaluations of 7 basis subkey-dependent zero-correlation masks zi, i = 0, 1, ..., 6. Compute
z from y6 with 7 subkey-dependent basis zero-correlation masks zi, i = 0, 1, ..., 6, save it in
V [z], that is V [z]+ = V6[y6].
10. Compute the statistic T according to Equation (2.1). If T < τ , the guessed key value
is a right key candidate. As there are 32 master key bits that we have not guessed, we do
exhaustive search for all keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
Complexity of the Attack. In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7
and the type-II error probability β1 = 2
−10. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 3.09, n = 64, l = 27.
The date complex N is about 262.9 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 26.23. The time complexity
of steps 1-10 in the described attack is as follows:
(1) Step 1 requires 262.9 memory accesses.
(2) Step 2 requires 262.9 × 248 memory accesses, because we should guess 48 bits K1, K2
and K ′7, and compute y1 from y0, and then update V1 for 262.9 times.
(3) Step 3 requires 248 × 27 × 260 memory accesses, because for all of guessed 48 bits keys
in previous steps we should guess 7 bits for K ′3[0 − 6], and compute y2 from y1, and
then update V2 for 2
60 times.
(4) Step 4 requires 255 × 29 × 253 memory accesses, because for all of guessed 55 bits keys
in previous steps we should guess 9 bits for K8[0 − 8], and compute y3 from y2, and
then update V3 for 2
53 times.
(5) Step 5 requires 264 × 27 × 244 memory accesses, because for all of guessed 64 bits keys
in previous steps we should guess 7 bits for K8[9 − 15], and compute y4 from y3, and
then update V4 for 2
44 times.
(6) Step 6 requires 271 × 29 × 237 memory accesses, because for all of guessed 71 bits keys
in previous steps we should guess 9 bits for K4[0 − 8], and compute y5 from y4, and
then update V5 for 2
37 times.
(7) Step 7 requires 280 × 27 × 228 memory accesses, because for all of guessed 80 bits keys
in previous steps we should guess 7 bits for K4[9 − 15], and compute y6 from y5, and
then update V6 for 2
28 times.
(8) Step 8 requires 242 × 7 Table T1 accesses.
(9) Step 9 requires 296 × 221 memory accesses.
(10) Step 10 requires 286 × 232 7-round MISTY1 encryption. Because 296 · 2−10 = 286 key
candidates can survive in the wrong key filtration.
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Figure 5: Attacks on 7-round MISTY1 without FL layers
If we consider one memory accesses as a 7-round encryption, the total time complexity is
about 2119.5 of 7-round MISTY1. The total compute complexity is about 2119.5 7-round
MISTY1 encryptions with 262.9 known plaintexts and 293 memory bytes for counters.
5 Key-Recovery Attack on 7-RoundMISTY1 without FL Lay-
ers
In this section, the multidimensional zero-correlation linear attack on 7-round MISTY1 with-
out FL layers is presented. The 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations start from 3
round and end at 7 round, and extend one round forward and backward, respectively, see
Fig. 5. We select the 5-round zero-correlation linear approximations as:
(β‖0, 0) 3 to 7 round−→ (0, β‖0),
where β is 16-bit non-zero value with β[7− 15] = 0. The choice is to minimize the key words
guessing during the attack on 7-round MISTY1. Form Observations 3, we know that, KI2,1,
KI2,2, KI2,3, KO2,3,KO2,4, KI8,1, KI8,2, KI8,3, KO8,3 and KO8,4 are not involved in the
computation, which can help us to reduce the complexity of the attack.
Basis Zero-correlation Masks. Assume that m0,...,m6 are seven 16-bit values, and
m0 = (1, 0, .., 0), m1 = (0, 1, 0, ..., 0),..., m6 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, ..., 0). Let zi = (mi[0 −
6]‖mi[0 − 6]), i = 0, 1, ..., 6, then we know {zi}i=0,1,...,6 are a group of basic zero-correlation
masks.
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Attack Process. The zero-correlation linear attack on 7-round MISTY1 without FL
layers with the partial-sum technique is demonstrated as follows.
1. Collect N plaintexts with corresponding ciphertexs. Allocate a 8-bit counter N0[x0] for
each of 271 possible values
x0 = x
1
0‖x20‖x30‖x40‖x50,
where x10 = L1,r, x
2
0 = L1,l, x
3
0 = R8,r, x
4
0 = R8,l, and
x50 = R1,r[0− 6]⊕R8,r[0− 6]⊕ L1,r[0− 6]⊕R8,r[0− 6],
and set them zero. Calculate the number of pairs of plaintext-ciphertext with given values
x0 and save it in N0[x0]. In this step, around 2
64 plaintext-ciphertext pairs are divided into
271 different states. So the assumption N0 as a 8-bit counter is sufficient.
2. Allocate a counter N1[x1] for each of 2
39 possible values
x1 = x
1
1‖x21‖x31,
where x11 = x
1
0, x
2
1 = x
3
0, and set them zero. For 2
32 possible values of x20‖x40, guess the 16-bit
KO1,1 = KO8,2, that is K2, and compute
x31 = x
5
0 ⊕ S9
(
(x20 ⊕K2)[0− 8]
)⊕ (x20 ⊕K2)[9− 15]⊕ S7((x20 ⊕K2)[9− 15])
⊕S9
(
(x40 ⊕K2)[0− 8]
)⊕ (x40 ⊕K2)[9− 15]⊕ S7((x40 ⊕K2)[9− 15]),
and update the value N1[x1] = N1[x1] +N0[x0].
3. Allocate a counter N2[x2] for each of 2
23 possible values of
x2 = x
1
2‖x22,
where x12 = x
2
1 and set them zero. For all 2
16 possible values of x11, guess the 16-bit KO1,2,
that is K4, and compute
x22 = x
3
1 ⊕ S9
(
(x11 ⊕K4)[0− 8]
)⊕ (x11 ⊕K4)[9− 15]⊕ S7((x11 ⊕K4)[9− 15]),
and update the value N2[x2] = N2[x2] +N1[x1].
4. Allocate a counter N3[x3] for each of 2
7 possible values of x3, and set them zero. For
all 216 possible values of x12, guess the 16-bit KO8,1, that is K8, and compute
x3 = x
2
2 ⊕ S9
(
(x12 ⊕K8)[0− 8]
)⊕ (x12 ⊕K8)[9− 15]⊕ S7((x12 ⊕K8)[9− 15]),
and then, update the value N3[x3] = N3[x3] +N2[x2].
5. Allocate a 64-bit counter vector N [z] for 7-bit z, where z is the concatenation of
evaluations of 7 basis zero-correlation masks zi, i = 0, 1, ..., 6. Compute z from x3 with 7
basis zero-correlation masks, save it in N [z], that is N [z]+ = N3[x3].
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6. Compute the statistic T according to Equation (2.1). If T < τ , the guessed key value
is a right key candidate. As there are 80 master key bits that we have not guessed, we do
exhaustive search for all keys conforming to this possible key candidate.
Complexity of the Attack. In this attack, we set the type-I error probability β0 = 2
−2.7
and the type-II error probability β1 = 2
−48. We have z1−β0 ≈ 1, z1−β1 ≈ 7.91, n = 64, l = 27.
The date complex N is about 263.9 and the decision threshold τ ≈ 26.97.
During the encryption and decryption phase, the complexity of Step 1,2,3,4 is no more
than 263.9 memory access, 263.9 × 216 memory access, 239 × 216 × 216 = 271 memory access
and 223 × 216 × 216 × 216 = 271 memory access, respectively.
Step 5 can be done independently. The complexity of Step 5 is no more than 7× 27× 248
memory access.
Step 6 requires 280 7-round MISTY1 encryption, because for all of guessed 248 keys in
previous steps, only the right key candidate can survive in the wrong key filtration, the
complexity of Step 7 is about 280 7-round MISTY1 encryption.
If we consider one memory accesses as a 7-round encryption, the total time complexity is
about 2118 of 6-round MISTY1. In total, the data complexity is about 263.9 known plaintexts,
the time complexity is about 281 of 7-round encryptions and the memory requirements are
261 bytes for counters.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the security of 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers by
means of multidimensional zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis. Firstly, some properties of
the FL function in MISTY1 have been proposed, following which we have constructed the
first known 5-round subkey-dependent zero-correlation linear distinguishers of MISTY1 with
FL layers. This distinguishers cover the same number of rounds as the zero-correlation linear
distinguishers for MISTY1 without FL layers and we explain that those subkey-dependent
zero-correlation linear distinguishers can also be used in the multidimensional zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis. In order to reduce the number of guessed subkey bits, we find some
observations on FO, FI and FL functions and select out a part of the subkey-dependent zero-
correlation linear approximations and then, conduct the multidimensional zero-correlation
attacks on the 7-round MISTY1 with 4 FL layers. The advantages of the attack over ex-
haustive search are about 128− 119.5 = 8.5 bits. Besides, multidimensional zero-correlation
linear cryptanalysis of 7-round MISTY1 without FL layers has been conducted. None of the
two attacks directly threatens the security of MISTY1, but they reduce the security margin
of the cipher and give us an example to evaluate the effects of the FL layers.
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